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OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGIONAL MARKET 
I» Advantages arid disadvantages of the multi-national market 
Advantages 
Productivity and hence the rate of economic development will grow more 
rapidly as a result of the considerable expansion of the market consequent 
upon multi-national integration as compared with the relative smallness of 
national- markets. This expansion will have the following effects: 
(a) As specialization develops, it will be possible to extend the 
import substitution process to more complex sectors of industry under more 
favourable economic conditions than those obtaining at present in national 
markets, especially as regards the production of capital goods, certain 
durable consumer goods (for example, motor vehicles) and intermediate goods 
of industrial origin; 
(b) It will also facilitate specialization in existing industries with 
a consequent reduction in costs; 
(c) It will create favourable conditions for the export of industrial 
commodities to the rest of the world as a result of the increased productivity 
deriving from the improvements described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b); 
(d) It will give free access to the raw materials of the whole region 
and facilitate the more effective utilization of common resources; 
(e) It will promote trade in agricultural commodities and remove the 
obstacles now Impeding such trade; 
(f) It will stimulate foreign investment; 
(g) It will increase the bargaining power of the Latin American countries 
in their trade relations with other areas. 
Disadvantages 
The following disadvantages of the common market have been pointed out: 
(a) The common market might cause excessive industrial concentration 
in one or several of the industrially more advanced countries to the detriment 
of industries which already exist in the others or which offer the best 
prospects of future development, and hence may prejudice their economic growth. 
/(b) The above 
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(b) The above disadvantage may well be felt among countries at present 
at a similar stage of industrialization (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, for example) 
but it would have a particularly oad effect on the less developed countries 
of Latin America; at the same time, the old dispute over the international 
division of labour would tend to recur between the less developed ard the more 
advanced countries and slow down the rate of development in the weaker countries. 
(c) Similarly, the less developedcountries might be compelled to acquire 
their capital, intermediate or cons timer goods from the more advanced countries 
of the common market at prices higher than those obtaining in the rest of the 
world, although they would sell their raw materials to them at international-
prices« 
(d) Countries, like Venezuela, which are not faced with the persistent 
problem of adverse foreign trade balances, might also suffer from the above dis-
advantage by having' to pay dollars for goods acquired from the common market 
when they might get them more cheaply from the rest of the world, 
(e) Certain countries, like Argentina, where agricultural production 
predominates, might suffer serious setbacks in the agricultural sector as the 
result of competition from countries with greater productivity, 
IIo The scope of the common market ^ 
There are various ideas concerning the scope of the common market both 
as regards the number of countries ard the range of commodities tc be included, 
(a) Countries 
(1) Should the common market be restricted to neighbouring countries 
or to those closely linked by geographical or economic ties or should it be 
extended to all or most countries of Latin America? 
(2) If it is extended to all or most of them, should the process be 
immediate or should a start be made with groups of countries leaving 
membership open to others? 
As regards point (1), it might be argued that the southern countries of 
Latin America which already trade relatively actively among themselves might be 
keener to integrate with their neighbours rather than with Mexico, for 




On the other hand, if there were a common market, countries like 
Mexico which have achieved a high degree of industrialization, might prefer 
to exchange industrial products - not to speak of others - under the 
established preferential system. Such a system might overcome the obstacle 
of distance and facilitate industrial diversification and specialization. 
(3) Is this in fact likely to happen in the case of Mexico and other 
distant countries? 
From a nother point of view, it might be maintained that the participation 
.of such industrially advanced but distant countries might have a beneficial 
effect on the trade of the less developed countries which, otherwise, might 
tend to depend too much on their more powerful neighbours. 
As regards point {2)\ while the principle of expanding the common market 
gradually might make it easier to enter into negotiations forthwith, the 
temporary exclusion of certain countries might make it harder for them to 
join the market later because of the identity of interests that might 
meanwhile have developed in one group or the other and because of the 
possibility that existing inequalities might be accentuated, 
(b) Commodities 
The idea of a gradual and progressive common market seems to have 
taken root, but there is basic disagreement as to' how to put it into practice. 
(4) Is it advisable to begin with a limited group of commodities and, 
in the light of results achieved, to extend the market to other commodities by 
means of successive negotiations between Governments? or 
(5) Would it be preferable to include all commodities from the outset 
and to determine immediately the form in which tariffs and restrictions are 
to be reduced in the course of time, without recourse to fresh negotiations? 
The first solution might appear more prudent; the effect of abolishing 
customs duties and restrictions in respect of groups of articles, where the 
advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages, should be examined before 
arrangements are made in successive negotiations to include other commodities. 
On the other hand, the prudence of such successive negotiations is open 
to question because, if the preliminary arrangements to create the common 
market are carried out in a piecemeal and dilatory manner, there is the 
risk that new interests may come to the fore which will make the establishment 




Moreover, the wider the rarge of the common market, both as 
regards countries and commodities, the more likely it is that its 
advantages will be equally distributed among all participants, 
To question (5) there are several answers, which may be summed up as 
follows : 
(a) A complete list of commodities might be drawn up and specifications 
made in respect of each regarding the iranner in which the customs duties 
levied upon it will be gradually reduced; 
(b) Groups of commodities might be agreed upon and the annual percentage 
of the decrease in the duties to be levied on each group might be determined; 
(c) Instead of individual or group decreases, a total average decrease 
in customs duties or other restrictions might be worked out in such a way 
that each contracting State is free to eliminate gradually such duties and 
restrictions in the form which disrupt its e conoiry least; in order to avoid 
an arbitrary choice, the average should be calculated by weighing each duty 
with the total consumption of the relevant commodity. 
It is felt that this formula, besides obviating the difficulty of 
classifying and grouping commodities, has the merit of flexibility. In 
addition to the direct advantages accruing therefrom, it would facilitate 
bilateral negotiations designed to establish reciprocal reductions of interest 
to two countries, independently of their automatic extension to other 
contracting members. 
While suggestion (b) may not offer these advantages of flexibility, 
it has others, particularly that of enabling tariff reductions to be 
extended progressively within a previously determined and accepted programme. 
The first reductions would apply to that group of commodities where there are 
no or only incipient interests involved, while those relating to fully 
established industries which need time to adapt themselves to the new 
competitive conditions of the regional market would come last. The first 
group would include those capital and other durable goods, as well as 
intermediate products, the production of which the more advanced countries 
of Latin America should undertake or encourage in the next few years, in 
order to accelerate development and offset the persistent trend towards 




In this connexion, a very important point arises; so far, no 
information is available - and this matter should certainly be clarified -
on the actual or potential significance of the tariff as a factor affecting 
the pattern and volume of inter-Latih American trade. Nor is it clear, in 
the case of certain commodities to which tariffs cannot be applied, whether 
trade liberalization should rather be based on quantitative or other non-
customs procedures, 
III« The common tariff ris-a-vis the rest of the world 
The common market also presupposes a common customs tariff vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world. In certain Latin American countries, inflation has 
led to the virtual disappearance of tariffs, and the task of reintroducing 
them is extremely urgent, The tariff in a developing country is a dynamic 
instrument. Commodities on which no tariffs are levied at present because 
it is politic to stimulate the activities using them (for example, the 
capital and intermediate goods previously referred to) might have to be 
classified as dutiable in the course of time in order to encourage their 
replacement by domestically produced goods. 
(6) On what principle should the common tariff be based? Should 
protection be restricted to commodities which are at present essential, 
leaving future problems to be settled by subsequent negotiations, or 
should such problems be tackled now by levying the appropriate duties? 
This question does not relate to the future alone; it also has bearing 
on the different stages of economic development attained by the Latin 
American countries, Indeed, it has just been seen that the more advanced 
countries are starting to replace imports of complex durable goods (both 
capital and consumer) arid of intermediate products by domestically-produced 
goods, while other countries have to continue importing them. The common 
market would compel these latter countries to import such goods from other 
contracting countries under the established tariff preference. A relative 
rise in the price of these goods will result, since the Latin American 
countries cannot match the lower costs obtaining in the rest of the 
world, which is the very reason for recommending the preferential system. 
/In a 
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In a common market this drawback is more than offset by the marked advantages 
involved. It is essential for the financing1 of the market that such 
advantages should be reciprocal. However, a country, particularly a less 
developed one, might import gocds from the other Latin American countries . 
instead of from the rest of the world without being able to pay for -such 
imports with exports of similar magnitude to those countries. This is a 
particularly important case which is dealt with in section V. 
IV. Detrimental effects of the common market on certain activities 
The common market is an essentially dynamic project. When any industry 
or activity has to readjust its production while demand is constantly growing 
and there is room for new competitors, the process of readjustment is much 
less difficult than when demand is stationary, In this sense, the Latin 
American common market will be dynamic. Nevertheless, cases may arise where 
the readjustment made necessary by external competition becomes difficult 
and where the displaced manpower is rust easily absorbed in other activities. 
Again, for different reasons or in order to increase future demand, certain 
activities may require special encouragement. These cases may occur both 
in industry and agriculture but the difficulties are likely to be acute in 
the latter sector particularly. 
(7) In the cases just referred to, should imports from other countries 
of the common market merely cover the increment in consumption (or a part of 
it) so as not to interfere with domestic agricultural production? 
V„ The situation of the less developed co'antriee 
In discussions on economic integration misgivings have often been 
expressed that the less developed countries might find themselves at a 
disadvantage as compared with the mere developed countries of Latin America 
if a common market is established„ Of course, it will offer them ample 
outlets for their export industries and other productive activities, but, 
if they are to take full advantage of these opportunities}such industries 
and activities should be able to compete with those of the more advanced 
countries, which will naturally take time. This raises a further question. 
/(8) For the 
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(g) Priority might be given to such industries in the financing of 
investments or the granting of credits, should it prove desirable to 
establish special financial machinery for the development of the common market, 
(9) At the same time, could consideration be given also to the par-
ticular situation of the landlocked Latin American countries so that the 
regional market might encourage their development? 
The position of these countries is becoming increasingly difficult 
because their economies are based on one or only a few lines of production. 
Would it be possible within the framework of the common market, to devise 
methods of facilitating, the absorption of their exportable production and 
the diversification of their economies? 
VI, Payments disequilibrium wlthin the regional market 
Two types of disequilibrium must be distinguished among the countries 
of the common market in their financial dealings with one another: temporary 
disequilibrium, whose causes are short-lived; and persistent disequilibrium 
deriving from structural defects which retard development. 
The problem of payments machinery in the common market and the possible 
use of credits as a first line of defence against temporary disequilibrium 
are dealt with later,, However, if the disequilibrium is not overcome by the 
use of these credits, 
(10) Could the country in question apply direct measures to restrict 
imports from other participating countries? What conditions and safeguards 
should apply to such measures? This raises another question: 
(11) Should the disequilibrium arise only vis-a-vis other, participating 
countries and not vis-a-vis the rest of the world, could the country in 
question apply restrictions on imports originating from them and not on those 
from the rest of the world? 
(12) Should the concerted reduction of tariffs be postponed in an 
effort to restore equilibrium or should special duties or charges be levied 
on imports? 
The case of persistent disequilibrium is more complex. For very 
different reasons (economic, social and political), one country might lag 
behind others in its industrial progress. In such circumstances, its 




(8) For the common market to work smoothly, mast special measures 
be taken to encourage the active participation of the less developed 
countries in the intra-regional trade in industrial commodities? Will tariff 
measures alone be enough,or vail consideration have to be given to additional 
incentives or direct measures tc promote industrial activity? 
As regards the tariff measures to be adopted, the following suggestions 
may be considered, as well as others which may arise later. 
(a) The less developed countries might be given a longer time in which 
to reduce their customs duties so that, in their own markets, growing 
industries will receive greater protection than the competing industries of 
the more advanced countries. 
(b) At the same time, the application of the common tariff vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world might be postponed; thus, while in the more developed 
countries the production of certain capital and intermediate goods would be 
protected immediately, the less developed countries might refrain from 
levying duties on such goods for a reasonable period and continue importing 
them from their normal sources of supply instead of from the common market. 
This process might continue until they can develop their own industrial 
exports to the more advanced countries, The problem described at the end 
of th£ previous section could be solved in this manner» 
(c) Pending the development of their own industrial exports, the less deve-
loped countries might grant the more advanced ones a temporary subsidy designed 
to compensate the former for the increased cost of capital and intermediate 
goods exported by the latter. 
(d) Also on a temporary basis, the more advanced countries might levy 
tariffs on imports from the less developed countries which would be more 
favourable to certain manufactured goods than to raw materials. 
(e) For a given period, the more advanced countries might be prohibited 
from establishing industries which cculd be developed in the less advanced 
count rie s c 
As regards incentives or direct measures of promotion, there is a wide 
variety of possibilities among which the following might be mentioned: 
(f) The authorization of tax exemptions in the less developed countries 
for the purpose of facilitating the establishment of industries there, or 
special measures to attract foreign capital. 
/(g) Priority might 
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comparable with that of the other countries and its tempo of development 
will consequently suffer» In some cases, a cautious revaluation of its 
currency abroad might encourage exports while discouraging imports and 
bring about structural changes which, together with other measures, might 
accelerate its economic growth. However, such a readjustment may not be' 
desirable for other reasons. In this case, 
(13")'Could the country concerned emply direet measures of protection, 
such as th re-imposition of tariffs which had already been reduced or 
eliminated, or subsidies, in order to bring about thefee structural changes? 
This question leads to another: 
(14) Could the country in question take these and other special measures 
by itself or would it have to consult or seek the approval of an interna-
tional authority appointed by common consent? 
In spite of these safeguards to meet extreme cases, countries would 
almost certainly be reluctant to give a firm promise to eliminate completely 
tariffs between participants, however long the period of time allowed. It 
might therefore be desirable to consider a compromise system which, without 
having all the advantages of absolute economic integration, would lead to a 
considerable increase in trade but at the same time would give each country 
some latitude to apply special measures in cases such as those just described. 
(15) Could the essential aims of the common market be achieved if the 
reduction of tariffs does not lead to their complete elimination but stops 
at a relatively low average leve].? 
In other words, tariff reductions would be based on an average and 
would cease once this average had reached a determined level. Each country 
would be free to remove individual tariffs provided that the weighted 
average of all the tariffs in no case fell below the agreed figure. 
Of course, the level reached need not be final. Further reduction to 
the point of complete elimination might be the subject of new negotiations, 
which would have the obvious advantage of being based on the experience 
derived from the gradual application of tariff reductions within the framework 




It should also be remebered that systematic co-operation between 
Governments could do much ta solve these problems. In order to increase 
trade, they should keep a constant watch on trade developments and 
encourage those additional exchanges of goods which will be necessary to 
remove or mitigate disequilibria, 
VIIo Multi-lateral clearing within the regional market 
The Governments cf the southern part of the continent have agreed upon 
measures for the gradual replacement cf the bilateral system by an automatic 
system of multilateral payments, Of course, the increase in trade brought 
about by the progressive reduction of customs duties and by other liberaliza-
tion measures will considerably facilitate the operation of a multilateral 
system, However, the development of the common market depends basically on 
the tariff preferences which the member countries grant to each other and the 
common tariff which they establish vlrv»è~vis the rest of the world. The 
following question then arises; 
(16) Is it necessary or desirable to maintain the multilatéral payments 
aysteiti and to extend it to air countries of the commen market? Or rather, has 
the time come for the countries which have abandoned bilateralism to make a 
decisive move towards the free convertibility cf balances deriving from 
trade within the common market, once the period of transition, is over? 
In fact, once bilateralism has been eliminated, favourable conditions 
might be created for the reintroduction of complete convertibility. What 
would then be the significance of a Latin American system of multilateral 
payments? 
In order to answer this question, the very important matter of credit 
must be considered. Trade within the common market would have to be developed 
with great flexibility, and credit is essential for this purpose. Such 
credit could be granted by existing tanks. However, besides other difficul-
ties, once convertibility has been re-established, credits granted to 
liquidate trade balances within the common market may finally be converted 
into hard currencies to the detriment of the requirements of trade with the 
rest of the world. The following question therefore arises: 
(17) Would it be enough for the countries to undertake to use only these 




reciprocal credits in units of account for the liquidation, -within certain 
limits, of trade balances within the common market, and should the debtor 
country be required to make payment in convertible currencies? only when 
such credits become exhausted? 
If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative, a system 
of multilateral payments would become an integral part of the common market. 
But howeverjsimple the system might be, certain special problems would 
undoubtedly arise. The most important of them might be expressed in the form 
ot the following question: 
(18) In a multilateral payments system in Latin America, what would be 
the position of countries which now have no difficulty in selling their 
exports on the world market for convertible currencies? Should these countries 
include such exports, when they are shipped to Latin America, in the 
multilateral clearing accounts or should they exclude them completely? Or 
might the solution lie midway between these two extremes? 
VIIIc Financial aspects of the common market 
There may be reasonable doubts as to whether the measures described in 
section IV will be sufficient to encourage the establishment .of new industries 
in the less developed countries so that they may enjoy the benefits that the 
common market may have to offer» To a certain extent, foreign private 
enterprises might be interested in this question. However, even though such 
industries may develop satisfactorily, consideration must also be given to 
the position of entrepreneurs in these and other Latin American countries, 
who may wish to participate in this process of industrialization. The problem 
of resources must therefore be tackled, and the following question arises: 
(3.9) Should the common market have as an adjunct a financial agency 
designed to promote the industrial development of the less advanced countries? 
Should such an agency restrict its activities to these countries or should it 
extend then to the other countries as well so as to encourage all the efforts 
made to ensure the more effective operation of the common market and a better 




As always happens when the establishment of bodies of this kind 
is mooted consideration must be given to the danger of duplicating existing 
international credit institutions« The following additional questions there-
fore arise: 
(a) Would the special character of this agency be enough to Justify 
its establishment and allow it to receive financial help from existing bodies 
in order to fulfil its particular purposes? 
(b) Is it likely that participating Governments would contribute to 
a fund of units of account designed to finance the operations, or part of the 
operations, entailing expenditures within the same countries of the area, so 
that external financial aid would be extended only in respect of that part 
of the expenditure which was incur/zed outride the common market? 
(c) To what extent might the Chilean move to earmark part of the monetary 
reserves of the Latin American countries for a common fund be related to 
the problem of financing these operations? Would it be wise to use these 
resources for operations lasting several years, such as industrial investments, 
or should their use be limited to shorter-term credits designed to finance 
exports within the common market or imports of raw materials or intermediate 
goods from the rest of the world? 
(d) Is it likely that participating Governments would agree to give 
firm guarantees for all operations, especially those financed with 
resources made available by international credit agencies cr, in general, 
with allocations from the rest of the world? 
However these problems are solved it should be borne in mind at all 
times that the lack of social overhead capital investment is one of the 
greatest obstacles to economic development, particularly in the less developed 
countries of Latin America, and will obvioasly be felt in the regional 
grouping of industries within the common market. 
(20) Would the co-operation of existing international credit agencies 
be sufficient to solve this problem? Or should the more developed countries 
play their part in the provision of social overhead capital at least to the 
extent to which such expenditure is incurred within the common market itself? 
/A few 
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A few figures suffice to give an idea of the effort which the more 
advanced countries might have to make. The incomes of Central American 
countries, plus Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in the north, and Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Paraguay, in the oouth, taken together amount to 8 per cent of 
that of the other Latin American countries. Thus for each 1 per cent increase 
in income by which the coefficient of capital formation might be raised in 
the former countries, the other countries would need to transfer the 
equivalent of only 0,08 per cent of their national incomes (3#*5 niillion 
. 1 units of account)t 
IXq Co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the 
common ;:a,r.ket c^unr vies 
Among several others, the following are two important fields where the 
need for co-ordination might be examined: 
(a) Monetary policy - to ensure that no participating country may 
compete unfairly with the exports of the ethers as a result of an external 
currency devaluation which is greater than its internal devaluation« 
(b) Fiscal policy - in order to avoid tax exemptions which interfere 
with the smooth working of the common market, 
(21) As regards the first point: is it likely that the participating 
countries, while they might agree on certain fundamental measures of 
co-ordination outside the common market, would subordinate certain decisions 
affecting monetary policy to such agreement? Or would It perhaps be preferable, 
in order to allow countries to retain their freedom of action, to adopt 
certain measures any to correct avj deviation which was in fact tantamount 
to unfair competition? 
In this connexion, 
(a) Would it be an admissible procedure, for example, to allow the 
countries unfavourably affected to offset external over-devaluation by levying 
compensatory charges on imports from the countries whose currency is over-
devalued? Or, alternatively, could the countries affected require that the 
countries whose currency is over-devalued abroad should levy similar 




(22) As regards fiscal policy, would it be possible to work out 
arrangements whereby tax exemptions would be limited to certain specific 
cases, as for example that of the less developed countries, or cases in which 
industrial development may have been slower or where it may have been 
necessary to encourage to a certain extent the regional distribution of 
particular industries? 
X0 The administration of the regional, market 
The basic structure of the regional market depends, of course, on the 
permanent agreement reached by the contracting parties,, However, in 
implementing the agreement, instances may arise, such as these described in 
this memorandum," in which a country may adopt measures affecting the others. 
Furthermore, if it is found desirable to supplement the common market with 
a special financial organization, problems of policy will arise which cannot 
be solved merely by referring to the organization!s statutes. Hence, 
a delicate problem arises: 
(23) Will the administration of the common market require an executive 
body to approve the decisions which its members propose to take in these 
special cases? Or will it suffice to establish an advisory body, supplemented 
by a suitable arbitration procedure, to solve the problems which may arise? 
X I . International undertakings 
The general principle governing international trade in Latin America, 
with the exception of border traffic, is equality of treatment for all 
countries. In a very few cases, exceptions to this rule may be found in the 
exemptions or special treatment granted on the basis of reciprocity by 
neighbouring countries or those with special historical or geographical ties. 
The features and characteristics of the regional market are exceptional 
in the sense that reciprocal exemptions or privileges granted by the 
contracting parties have to be extended to third countries. 
An exception to the "most-favoured-nation clause" is allowed in the case 
of States members of GATT in conformity with certain provisions of the 





(24) Although only eight latin American countries belong to 
GAT?, should the regional market be established in accordance with those 
provisions of the General Agreement or should some other procedure be 
adopted? Would, negotiations be necessary with every third country which 
benefits from the "most-favoured-nation clause"? And what action would 
subsequently be necessary to enable the Latin American countries to reach 
an agreement on joint negotiations with third countries? 
